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The mackerel fishery has become the most important pelagic species for export. Prior to 1994 
the allocations between the three main fleet groups, the purse seine, the coastal and the trawl 
fleet was negotiated on an annual basis. 1994, was an important year for the fisheries industry, 
the price subsidies were no longer appropriate after the implementation of the EEA 
agreement. A stronger focus on economic efficiency and the need for stability, political and 
economic, called for a more stable allocation of the quotas. The Norwegian Fishermen’s 
Association has been instrumental in the process of finding an acceptable Allocation key. 
However, the processes have been turbulent and critical for the Norwegian Fishermen’s 
Association. The authorities followed the key more or less, the advice from the Norwegian 
Fisherman’s Association weights heavily in the management system. The notion that 
participation in the decision-making process yields legitimacy is central to understand the 
emphasis the authorities have laid on the compromises. However, the notion of the legitimacy 
of the procedure may be questionable. The representational share of the different interest 
groups in the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association is under debate. Furthermore, through a 
series of events the coastal mackerel fishery was in 2002 regulated by limited access for all 
vessels. The limited access must be understood most as an economical regulation, however 
behind this regulation strong interests have played a significant role. Co-management within 
the “family” will hence concentrate on a long-term allocation, which is now determined for 
the next 7 years. But whether this is perceived as legitimate in the wider circles of 
stakeholders is still open for debated. The issue of payment of resource rent is pending. Stable 
conditions, in particular political, may therefore be something of an illusion, even if the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
It is a trend in several highly developed fisheries that national quotas are allocated as 
ITQ's (Individual Transferable Quotas) (se for example Hannesson, 1994).  However, in 
Norway this management model has been resisted (Hersoug, Holm and Rånes, 2000). But 
even if ITQ's have been resisted in the Norwegian context, the ideas of allocating quotas 
between individual vessels and between fleet segments is an established practice in the 
most important fisheries in Norway. Limiting the access to the fisheries has, in parts of 
the fleet segments, also become an established, accepted and even requested development. 
The principle for the allocation does not differ from the proposed ITQ (Individual 
Transferable Quotas) system; it is based on historical rights. Some authors addressing the 
theme of regulations and management directions would regard these as the outcome of a 
series of events and compromises to the changing needs and challenges in the fisheries 
(Se Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). Thus, understanding the processes leading towards the 
allocation keys and the limiting access to the mackerel fisheries may be understood in the 
context of the history of the fishery. The need for management of the Norwegian 
mackerel fishery follows the development in the fishery. The approach to management 
decision procedures however, may be more relevant when it comes to the preferred 
models of management. The approach to management decisions in Norway is through 
processes of extensive consultations with the industry. The tradition is that the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association has had a dominating role. The world has changed since the early 
start of the large-scale mackerel fishery in the beginning of the 1960's; directions of 
management strategies do not develop in isolation. Why the allocation keys were 
introduced and the resulting allocations together with the limited access must be 
understood according to the developments through history, the approach of co-
management and prevailing political climate.  
 
The objective and the problem definitions 
The objective of this thesis is to better understand the processes behind the current 
allocation key and the closure of the costal mackerel fisheries. 
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By reviewing the history of the mackerel fishery from the early 1960's and general 
developments of relevance for Norwegian fisheries management I hope to better 
understand why and how the allocation keys were constructed and why the mackerel 
fishery was finally closed. By answering four directed questions about regulations of the 
mackerel fishery I aim to better understand the implications and the nature of 
management and co-management in Norwegian fisheries. 
 
Why were the allocation keys introduced first in 1994 and then in 2001? 
Why did not the authorities follow the proposed keys?  
What were the results in terms of actual allocation and catch? 
Why was the mackerel fishery closed for the coastal fleet? 
 
Delimitation of the thesis 
In order to make the thesis tangible and manageable, it is necessary to limit the extent and 
depth of the analysis. The limitations made should not however exempt factors that are of 
importance in bringing clarity to the theme and limit the means of fulfilling my objective.  
 
With regards to the size of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) available for the Norwegian 
fleet, this is dependent on both the scientific advice and results of international 
negotiations. The work of and advice of the ICES (International Committee for the 
Exploration of the Seas), North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) along with 
the different bi- and multilateral agreements on international level are not of specific 
interest to this thesis. Thus the international side of the allocations are largely excluded. 
Instead I will only note that the Norwegian quota varies as a result to this.  
 
The thesis will focus on the development of the mackerel fishery and the regulatory 
measures that are related to allocations and limiting of access. There are several 
regulatory measures that are relevant in the mackerel fishery, but in meeting my 
objectives it is not necessary to go into the details of all regulations. Furthermore, the 
allocations of quotas are also divided into maximum quotas, vessel quotas and group 
quotas. The maximum- and vessel quotas are not of specific relevance for this thesis; it is 
the main group quotas that will be the focal point in this regard. Group quotas are divided 
into sub group quotas also. I shall however maintain a focus on the larger picture in which 
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I will mainly differentiate between the offshore purse seine fleet, the trawlers and the 
coastal fleet. However in the chapter of limiting access in the coastal mackerel fishery it is 
necessary to differentiate between the different sub groups.  
 
The allocations between the main different fleet segments may be analysed with regards 
to bargaining power of specific groups; individuals have at times considerable influence. 
However, the specifics of the individual (group) resources, strategies and objectives are 
not analysed here. Thus the discussions are based on outcome and process analysis, and 
trying to determine in retrospect factors that have been influential. The settlements in 
form of the allocation keys and the limiting of access are considered to express group 
interests and motives, based on generalisations to the parties' points of view and priorities. 
Furthermore, I will limit my analysis to be concerned with the major fleet groups and the 
authorities. In addition, the locus of the analysis is on the national level, implying that 
regional and local authority and county organisations' actions and positions are not of 
special interest. However, as the allocations between the different fleet segments have 
regional implications due to distributional patterns of vessel types, it may occasionally be 
relevant to relate interests regions. The interests of the onshore producers and sales and 
export organisations are not emphasised. The main focus will be on the harvest side of the 
industry. This is not only an expression of where the issue of allocations is most pressing 
but also that the priorities of the onshore side are more related to availability of raw 
material and to quality. The allocation of quotas is mainly an output control, and limiting 
of access is mainly an input control both aimed at the harvesting activity. As we are not 
speaking of major redistributions, the onshore activities are likely not to have strong 
objections nor have I found any indications that they have. 
 
Because the regulations are considered as outcomes of history and the approach of co-
management, different arenas and channels have been and are available. The Regulatory 
Council and the annual meeting of the Norwegian Fisherman's Association are major 
arenas where interests are articulated through representation. The structural properties of 
these arenas and prerogatives to representation and authority are not elaborately 
described. Rather, the organisation of the decision-making system is outlined. 
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Data and method 
The purpose of this section is to give a description of how and where the data is collected 
and to discuss properties of the method chosen. A requirement of all scientific studies is 
that the results allow for scrutiny.  
 
Method is a tool, a procedure from which problems are solved and new insight achieved 
(Holme and Solvang, 1996; 14). According to Hellvik (1991; 15) certain central norms 
apply if a method is appropriate for studies in social sciences. These are: 1. That the result 
of a study is supported by evidence in reality. 2. That the collection of data is systematic 
(in order to avoid bias). 3.  An accurate use of data (in order to secure reliability). 4. An 
effort to eliminate prior perceptions. 5. To present the results which allows for scrutiny, 
control and critique.  6. That the result must open for new knowledge.  
These are rather extensive criterions, especially when it comes to a relative limited sized 
thesis, but it is useful to keep these criterions in mind. 
 
The choice of method is directed by the objectives and the problems defined (Holme and 
Solvang, 1996). That is that the method used depends on the stated objective and the 
research questions. In approaching my objective and the nature of the research questions it 
is natural to choose a method that follows the principles of historical methods. Such is the 
method of document analysis (Holme and Solvang, 1996). This means that data are 
collected from written records that are part of an historical whole (Holme and Solvang, 
1996). Data that are relevant to these questions are available as both qualitative and 
quantitative data records of history.  
 
The method used in this thesis may be characterised as a qualitative method, implying that 
the objective is primarily to increase the total understanding and not to test the validity of 
data (Holme and Solvang, 1996; 15). There are both strengths and weaknesses related to 
the use of methods. A strength of quantitative method is that it opens for a more complete 
understanding of social processes and systems, furthermore qualitative investigations are 
characterised by flexibility which allows for a less rigid approach to the. A weakness may 
be related to how data are collected which may make comparisons more difficult problem. 
Furthermore, a qualitative approach to the data may yield interpretations that are less 
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unvaried (Holme and Solvang, 1996). Relevant then is the question of where to collect 
these data. 
 
Material for this analysis was collected primarily from public documents available, such 
as reports from the Norwegian Fisherman's Association, the Directorate of Fisheries, the 
Department of Fisheries, secondary literature review and newspaper articles. Thus, the 
data was gathered by document analysis. Analysing the documents requires a clear 
reflection over the quality of the data, and being aware that statements may be normative 
and cognitive (Holme and Solvang, 1996). A benefit from using numerical data is that 
they more readily qualify as being neutral. However, I did observe some differences in the 
numbers used. The problem of neutrality is not only related to data, but also for use in the 
theoretical perspective. Theories often have a normative origin (Østerud, 1996). 
 
Some quantitative data is presented and is collected mainly from public statistics on from 
the Stortingsmelding 51 (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998) In addition Pehrson and Ramsli 
(1998) collected a considerable amount of quantitative data in their master project. Their 
data is collected from official statistics of the Central bureau of Statistics (SSB), the 
Herring sales organisation (Norges Sildesalgslag), the Directorate of Fisheries and the 
Fiskeridepartementet (1997-98 St. meld 51). I use statistics from various sources, all duly 
noted. Most of the statistics have been controlled against the primary sources, but all years 
have not been available. Though errors may occur, the main intention has been to show 
trends. 
 
The most important documents concerning the allocation keys and the limiting of access 
are reports from the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. Depending considerably on 
secondary sources may be a weakness of this thesis, however development trends may 
substantiate the interpretations made. Evidence may be circumstantial, and thus requires 
efforts to interpretation. With regards to the last developments towards the 2001 
allocation key, the debate was readily available in the newspapers, and thus may provide 
clarity to interests and motives of the different parties. All facts relevant to the allocations 
and the authority interventions were not available thus some interpretations of the 
outcomes is necessary. 
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Document analysis is a method in which the observations are made through written 
records. The problems faced with choosing such a method are mainly related to the 
sources. As sources reflect priorities and a selection of the data recorded, it is only part of 
a historical time. The ideal situation is when multiple sources are available, mutually 
independent, detailed and related written at the time of events by neutral, competent 
witnesses (Holme and Solvang, 1996; 130). Preferably the sources are primary, but the 
closer a source is to the problem and situation the more weight may be put on it (Holme 
and Solvang, 1996). Interpretation is an important part of document analysis, this means 
that the content and the objectives of the sender (originator) are analysed. However, prior 
to interpretations the characteristics of the source must be considered. These 
characteristics are related to whether the document is mainly normative or cognitive, 
whether it constitutes is an assessment, description, prediction or statements of 
programme (Holme and Solvang, 1996). Further, the relationship between sender and 
receiver will influence the appropriateness of the document to reveal the information that 
is requested. For example, public sources from institutional origin such as government 
reports may not be sufficient in revealing the processes behind a decision; more 
confidential sources such as internal working drafts will be more informative (Holme and 
Solvang, 1996). At this point, the documents that were available to me clearly exhibit a 
weakness, and thus I have to rely on secondary sources and to the extent the reports 
reveals sides of the processes.  
 
Reflections over the role as a student 
Choosing a theme for an analysis is based on perceptions of the phenomenon that catches 
ones interest (Holme and Solvang, 1996). And I, being relatively new to the area of social 
science studies have been almost blinded by the selection of theories that could have 
explanation force on the phenomenon of fisheries management. I must admit that my 
initial attraction to the theme may have been somewhat tickled by the normative 
statements from so many sources. Naturally, as a student of fisheries management one 
cannot escape reflecting over personal political preferences.  In my defence, I claim that 
the process so far has lead my to become increasingly uncertain of my own preferences. 
Holme and Solvang (1996) speak of these normative and cognitive circles, the 
hermeneutical circles. These processes led to vast amounts of available theories and 
perspectives in social sciences that sometimes have been more confusing than 
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educational. However, taking on social science studies with a primarily natural science 
background has in the end hopefully given me new perspectives. I believe that this must 




In chapter one the theme is introduced, and objective and problem definition specified. 
The method and data used and reflections over the course of study is reflected. 
 
In chapter two, the theoretical aspects are addressed. In this chapter concepts related to 
co-management theory is presented. Emphasis is put on participation and representation 
related to stakeholder theory and the concept of legitimacy.  
 
In the following chapter the background is presented through an introduction to the 
characteristics of the mackerel, an account of the history of the fishery, which exhibit the 
classical traits of biological and economical- over exploitation that leads to the beginning 
of the regulations. The formal organisation of the decision-making system within the 
Regulatory Council and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association is briefly sketched.   
 
In chapter four, I start with an introduction where the reviewing the situation prior to the 
1994 allocation, in order to set the allocation key within the context of time. In addition a 
brief presentation of what was discussed in 1991 for the prospects of long time allocation 
in the pelagic fisheries is in order.  
 
This is followed by a closer inspection of the report in 1994, which was an analysis of 
principles and trade-offs related to the allocation, and a more specific review of the 
mackerel fishery and the pelagic fishery more generally.  
 
In chapter 5, the allocation key is to be addressed. Starting with the experiences from the 
1994 allocation key. Further, I analyse the development in actual quotas and catch, along 
with the price developments. At the end of this chapter the discussions prior, during and 
after the Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association is presented as a 
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narrative in order to more precisely identify the interested parties (stakeholders). Finally 
the present allocation decided for the mackerel fishery is presented. 
 
In chapter six, the development towards the limitation of access in the mackerel fishery is 
analysed.  
 
Finally, the answer to the research questions are summarised, the observations are 
discussed in light of the theory, in the end some concluding remarks on the nature and 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical aspects 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to better understand what lead to the allocation of quotas 
between fleet groups and the limiting of access in the coastal fisheries management. By 
posing four directed research questions I aim to find empirical evidence to be discussed. 
These findings are to be discussed within a theoretical framework related to co-
management theory. I pose that the way the management setting is organised play a 
significant part in the actual outcomes from management. In addition history matters with 
regards to how the management system is organised. In this section I shall provide a 
theoretical framework in which the management of the Norwegian mackerel fishery may 
be understood.  
 
Co-management is a vast concept related to options for management strategies. The 
definition by Charles (2001) may illustrate the main ideas however. According Charles 
(2001; 265) co-management may be defined as:  
 
“ …the creation and implementation of suitable management arrangements 
through which a set of agreed stakeholders, i.e. fishers and their 
organisations, work jointly with government to develop and enforce fishery 
regulations and management measures”. 
 
The essential idea here is that stakeholders and government share decision-making and 
management functions. This implies that stakeholders have a stake in the fishery and in 
the management, that they share power with government when decisions are made and 
that they are co-responsible for the sustainability of these resources (Charles, 2001). Sen 
and Nielsen (1996; 406) offers another definition of co-management: “…an arrangement 
where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user 
groups”. 
 
What constitutes as suitable arrangements and whom these stakeholders or user groups are 
is not self-evident. It is a democratic tradition that the parties effected by decisions should 
be heard, they participate. But direct democracy seldom practical, thus democracy by 
representation is the most common solution. I shall first address theoretical aspects of 
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legitimacy in relation to participation, followed by aspects concerned with the 
organisation of co-management with regards to representation.  
 
Legitimacy and Participation  
Introduction 
A general hypothesis in co-management is that sharing responsibilities will make 
stakeholders more responsible, more inclined to perceive the regulations as legitimate and 
thus will act in compliance to the regulations (Jentoft, 2000 a), which will reduce the 
enforcement needs. But as Jentoft (2000a 144) claims legitimacy is: “ a premise and not 
only an outcome of a management system” 
 
A low degree of legitimacy may basically lead to two reactions, one is to not comply 
(exit), and the other is to give the discontent a voice (Jentoft, 2000a). The type of reaction 
will depend on the existence of institutions that opens for communication (Jentoft, 
2000a). Legitimacy is a complex principle that needs some closer presentation. According 
to Weber (1919) legitimacy is related to power relationships. But power must be 
perceived as legitimate, there must be a well-founded reason for those who hold power to 
limit the action of others (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). The test of legitimacy according to 
Jentoft (2000a) is legality, but also rationality and reasonability. The sources of legitimacy 
are from custom, authority (charisma) or legality (Weber, 1919) and in his perspective the 
legitimacy of power is perceived by those affected by public policy (Jentoft, 2000a). 
Power may simply be defined as (Salanick and Pfeffer, 1977; 417):  “ the ability to get 
things done the way one wants them to be done…”. In the previous section it was implied that 
co-management is the sharing of power between government and stakeholders (Charles, 
2001). As fisheries management regimes (system) are based on power, to whom this 
power should be allocated is therefore relevant. This is related to stakeholder theory 
presented under the section of participation. 
 
Legitimacy according to content and procedure 
According to Jentoft and Mikalsen (2001) the content of the regulative system may be 
perceived as what yields legitimacy. This implies that legitimacy fulfils some pre-
established standards and demands (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). Thus, the systems 
legitimacy is weighted against notions of what is considered rational, reasonable and just 
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for those who are subject to the regulations. According to Jentoft and Mikalsen (2001) 
there are three reasons why persons affected by regulations or management measures will 
follow the regulations; the fear of being punished, respect for the law, that the regulations 
are well founded. Legitimacy is related to the two latter, as the fishermen will feel 
compelled by rational and or moral reasons to follow the regulations (Jentoft and 
Mikalsen, 2001). Therefore, as legitimacy may be considered as dependent on belief 
systems and is therefore subjective and normative. 
 
Legitimacy may also be perceived from the manner in which the regulations are decided, 
procedure legitimacy (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). A management approach that may be 
termed instructive, the process is that the authorities or government informs the affected 
parties (or users) of their planned decision (Sen and Nielsen, 1996). This constitutes as a 
so-called “top-down” decision making process. And by definition does not constitute as 
co-management. Alternative process approaches lie in what may be termed “bottom-up” 
(Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). The degree of information exchange and participation in the 
decision making process may be illustrated according to the “imaginary ladder of 
participation”1  (see for example Charles, 2001; Sen and Nielsen, 1996). This implies that 
the fishers have the opportunity to discuss and make suggestions to how the regulations 

















   















Figure 2.1. Combination of procedural and content legitimacy. 
 
                                                           
1 Expression from Hersoug and Rånes (1997) 
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Figure 2. Based on figure in Jentoft and Mikalsen (2001) that is an illustration of the 
different perceptions of legitimacy and how they relate to eachother. Box 1 and 4 are 
clear-cut, the interesting is box 2 and 3. What is most important for legitimacy, content or 
procedure? According to Jentoft and Mikalsen (2001) the procedural legitimacy is 
important, as a decision made by the majority may not have to be forced on the minority. 
The democratic advantage is that if a person or group affected disagrees with the content 
of the decision he is perhaps more inclined to accept if he/they were given the opportunity 
to express their view.  
 
Participation 
According to Jentoft (2000a) it is necessary to distinguish between external and internal 
legitimacy. What is perceived as legitimate by those outside the decision making process 
may differ from that what the directly involved considers to be legitimate processes and 
participation (Jentoft, 2000a). The former is related to “legitimate participation”, and is 
thus related to stakeholder theory. The latter may be termed “participatory legitimacy”2. 
Stakeholder theory may also give insight to why interests differ in influence. Participatory 
legitimacy is related to the discussion under the section of content and procedure 
legitimacy, but also to how interests are represented. In the following I aim to clarify who 
these stakeholders are that have legitimate right to participate, but also that the actual 
inclusion of different groups is based on other factors such as power and urgency. In the 
next section I shall follow the outline of Mikalsen and Jentoft's (2001) account for 
stakeholder theory, inspired by Mitchell et al (1997) and draws on the experience of 
organisational research.  
 
Defining the Stakeholders 
There are two central questions to the issue of stakeholders, one is related to who has 
legitimate claims, the other is related to salience that is who is actually considered 
significant to receive attention (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). According to Clarkson3 
stakeholders may be distinguished between primary stakeholders, who is: “.. one without 
whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as an ongoing concern”. And 
secondary stakeholders are: 
                                                           
2 This distinction were argued by Wilson and McCay (1998) referred in Jentoft (2000a) 
3 Clarkson (1995) cited in Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001; 283) 
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“..those who influences and effects, or are influenced and effected by, but 
are not engaged in transactions with the corporation, and are not essential 
for its survival the corporation but who are not engaged in transactions with 
the corporation and not essential for survival”.  
 
Thus, the stakeholder may be considered as those groups or individual’s support is 
essential for the organisational success and survival (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). 
According to Mitchell et al (1997) the stakeholders' position may be "scored" according to 
the attributes of legitimacy, power and urgency. This implies that the definite and clear-
cut stakeholders are those who hold all three attributes, those whom may be expected to 
be stakeholders possess two of these attributes, and those whom are latent stakeholders 
may claim to have one of these attributes (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). These attributes 
are not fixed but dynamic by nature, according to situation and knowledge.  Lack of 
power for instance, may be considered as inability to articulate or give sufficient voice to 
their claim. According to Sen and Nielsen (1996) the role that the groups or entities of 
stakeholders take on is related to their relative strength and capabilities and knowledge 
internally and towards government, the ability to speak with one voice. According to 
Charles (2001), the types of participants will depend on the type of conflict that is most 
urgent. Who or what in the end decides when a stakeholder becomes a participant is 
discussed in the following section.  
 
From Stakeholder to Participant  
In a fisheries management system, it is not always clear who qualifies and entitles 
stakeholders to gets managerial attention (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). According to 
Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) the “manager” is:  “… rarely a single formal institution, but 
rather an network of public and private participants”. As the management may be considered 
as a “political coalition”4 the role of management is may not be a simply described 
organisation according to hierarchy. This implies that the decision-making is a political 
process. This underscores the notion of what co-management is; a political struggle of 
conflicting interests over scarce resources. Who participates will be thus also be 
dependent on the already established organisation of the administration or management. 
However, who has ultimate authority and power is of significance, and most commonly 
                                                           
4 Expression from Cyert and March (1963) cited in Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) 
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this is the government in the vested authority of the Ministry of Fisheries, or the Minister 
of Fisheries (Mikalsen, and Jentoft, 2001). In co-management literature it is common to 
speak of roles of user groups and government. The government has an important function 
in enabling and empower stakeholders (see for example Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). 
 
Principles for representation 
Functional and territorial representation 
Before I continue a distinction between representation and participation may be in order, 
this as it seems in the literature that these are used interchangeably. Participation is related 
to who is represented, and representation is more of how these participants are 
represented. Fishermen or participants in general, are not a homogene collective (Jentoft 
and McCay, 1995). According to Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) the choice of principle for 
representation will affect the ability of the fishermen5 to articulate his interest, to discuss 
and vote in the decision making- and consultative processes. This will ultimately 
influence the legitimacy of the resulting regulations (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). As 
stated in the introduction section of this chapter, it is a democratic principle that those 
affected by a decision should be given the opportunity to express their views and 
concerns, but that direct representation is hardly practical. In the previous section I 
accounted for how one might identify these stakeholders and how these might qualify and 
actually be participants. In this section the principles of representation by function (sector) 
and territory is presented. The hypothesis by Jentoft and McCay (1995; 235) is that: 
“…the manner in which the fishermen are represented will have decisive effect on the 
management discourse and how they act in the decision situation”. This implies that how the 
fishermen are represented will influence the way they perceive the management system 
and how they will act in the decision situation. A functional representation implies that 
the user-groups, or fishermen, are organised and represented according to the technology 
they apply (Jentoft and McCay, 1995). This is also referred to as sector-based co-
management model (Charles, 2001). The specification of sector may be according to the 
specified fishery, vessel size, gear type etc (Charles, 2001).  According to Charles (2001), 
the membership of a sector is analogue to the term interest group, by which the fishers are 
defined. If this follows the traditional line of management this sectoring may yield relative 
coherence between the fishermen (Charles, 2001). Another approach to representation 
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may be that the fishermen are represented according to the region or territory in where 
they reside, this is what Jentoft and Mikalsen (1992) would term as territorial 
representation. This is equivalent to what Charles (2001) entitles the community-based 
co-management model (fisher-community-government relations).  
 
Jentoft et al (1998) ascertain that a territorial approach to representation will yield a more 
integrative fisheries co-management as fishermen's behaviour is more embedded in their 
communities' social and historical context. Though according to Jentoft et al (1998) it is 
commonplace in the co-management to approach communities as functional and “virtual” 
constructs, this may be interpreted to be that functional representation is based on an 
image of “community” between individuals using the same gear. A territorial community 
will thus differ in definition and is related to place, history and identity within a local 
community. (Jentoft et al, 1998). The advantage of a territorial approach to representation 
is that the relationship is more multi stranded than a functional representation that is a 
more single stranded relationship based on for example gear type (Jentoft et al, 1998). 
Both principles for representation call for homogeneity, equality and stability within the 
groups and according to Jentoft and McCay (1995) a combination of both is appropriate. 
The representation must be balanced in a manner such that decisions be made that all can 
agree on, and that it gains support within the respective constituencies and that the various 
groups of fishermen are given a relative share of positions in the decision making process 
(Jentoft and McCay, 1995).  
 
A principle of representation that promotes community disembeddedness may lead to a 
behaviour that according to Jentoft (2000b) is in line with what the rational choice 
theorists assumes, that man acts in a rational manner to maximise his individual utility. As 
a result, the internal group relationship may be described as a zero-sum game, where no 
one is better of without others being worse off (Jentoft, 2000b). However, if communities 
are well functioning, fishermen are more likely to perceive other fishermen not as 
competitors but rather have a stronger sense of solidarity (Jentoft, 2000b) and are thus 
more likely to exhibit self-restraint and the internal group interaction is more coherent. 
The point here is that the stronger the sense of unity within the groups that are 
represented, the less internal conflict the more influence on policy direction and outcome. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
5 From here the participants are specified fishermen 
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That functional representation is based on a more fragile coalition than is territorial 
representation may be assumed from this.  
What type of representation is dominant may not be by chance or direct choice; it is 
related to the development in administrative design. I shall here not venture into the 
different manners to how society may organise representation that may be considered 
democratic, all which have advantages and disadvantages (see i.e. Hernes). According to 
Heidar and Berntzen (1995) Nordic politics is characterised by continuity, stability and 
consensus. They (Heidar and Berntzen, 1995) claim that there is a very limited system 
opposition and this is why the political legitimacy is high in Norway and that it is a 
special characteristic that the will to compromise is high. This is caused by a homogenous 
society without segmentation based on ethical, religious and language grounds. According 
to Heidar and Berntzen (1995) Rokkan's statement " votes count, resources decide" 
expressed that Rokkan wanted to underscore that a corporatist channel had emerged in 
addition to the numerical democratic channel. Thus, the Norwegian system is balanced 
between numerical democracy and corporative pluralism. Influence in the prior is 
prioritised to those who get the most votes, in the latter influence is related to the 
resources (power) of the interested parties. However, according to Jentoft and Micalsen 
(2001) the legitimacy of a system is not so much based on tradition and previous actions, 
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Chapter 3: The background  
 
Introduction 
In order to grasp the situation we have today, the history of how the fishery has evolved in 
the context of the developments in important factors will yield a better understanding of 
the evolution towards allocation keys and limiting access to the fishery. As stated in the 
introductory chapter, regulations may be regarded as the outcomes of a series of events 
and directional choices. Therefore, by unfolding the story of the Norwegian fishery, and 
the mackerel fishery in particular, I hope that this will shed some light to the objective of 
the thesis. The story of the mackerel fishery starts with the end of the lucrative winter 
herring fishery in the North Sea. Prior to 1964 the mackerel fishery was mainly a small-
scale enterprise. It was a traditional coastal fishery in the southern parts of Norway. This 
changed dramatically when the offshore purse seine fleet directed their effort from the 
herring fishery, and from 1960 to 1968 the total Norwegian catches increased by over 
4000 percent! But, before going into the more detailed story of the fishery, a presentation 
of the mackerel and its characteristics is in order. As the story of the mackerel fishery 
unfolds, it exhibited the classical traits of biological and economic over exploitation and 
the need for management measures became evident. Therefore, the early beginnings of the 
regulations are presented. And as time passed, major institutional changes followed 
having consequences for the direction and organisation of management. Here the current 
organisation of representation on the Regulatory council and within the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association is briefly presented. 
 
Mackerel, its biology and stock development 
Where it is found, life history and migration 
Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) is a pelagic shoaling species found from North Africa, the 
Mediterranean, The Black Sea, West of the British Isles, in the North Sea and in the 
Norwegian Sea. Its migrational pattern related to feeding and spawning, and during the 
winter months it migrates to greater depths where it hardly feeds several months. Though 
it may reach a size of 66cm and weight up to 3,5kg, it rarely is larger than 40cm and 700g 
(Pethon, 1996). The mackerel matures and spawns for the first time when it is 
approximately 30cm long, and is then 2-3 years old. In Norwegian fisheries areas, two 
different spawning components occur, the western component that spawns southwest of 
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Ireland in February to July, and the North Sea component that spawns centrally in the 
North Sea May-July. Both have migrational patterns that have changed in the last years.  
The western component migrates after spawning northward west of the British Isles and 
into the North Sea and Norwegian Sea where it remains during fall and winter. The North 
Sea component remains within the perimeter of the North Sea-Skagerrak and southern 
parts of the Norwegian Sea its entire life (Iversen, 1995). A third spawning component, 
the southern component, which spawns of the coast of Portugal and Spain has also been 
found to migrate to the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea, and has from 1994 been 
managed with the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel (Iversen, 2001).  
 
The history of the stock 
The known history of the North Sea component extends back to the early 1960's, and at 
the time 3 million tonnes spawned in the North Sea (Iversen, 1995). As it were, the 
mackerel would almost suffer the same faith as the herring fishery as early as in the 
beginnings of the 1970's. From 1969 to 1971, the total landings of mackerel were more 












Figure 3.1. The development in spawning stock sizes of the North Sea and Western component. 
Based on tables from ICES ACFM report 2000. 
 
The ICES started a working group for the assessment of the mackerel stocks in 1974 as a 
response to the warnings of scientists in 1971 concerned with the declining catches in the 
North Sea area (Lockwood, 1988). There was a slight recovery in the state of the North 
                                                           
6 Statement based on numbers presented by the ICES Mackerel Working Group (ICES, 2001) 
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Sea component by 1973 (ICES, 2001). However, according to Lockwood (1988) this was 
due to one single year class. According to Lockwood (1988), the Norwegians were aware 
of these problems and introduced the first technical regulation that regulated the landing 
size of mackerel for reduction, that no more than 20 percent was to be of fish less than 
30cm (Loockwood, 1988). The Director at the time (in 1969), Sunnanå, said at the time 
that the researchers were not sure that the mackerel and herring stocks had been subject to 
an excessive fishery pressure (Nordstrand, 2000). Until the 1970’s several prominent 
researchers still believed that the human influence to the fish stocks was negligible 
(Nordstrand, 2000). As a consequence of the heavy exploitation, and low recruitment the 
spawning stock is now estimated to be approximately 70.000 tonnes (1999) (Iversen, 
2001). The biological history of the western component has been known from 1972. The 
spawning stock of this component has not been subject to such extreme decline as the 
North Sea component, and was in 1999 estimated to be approximately 2,95 million tonnes 
in 1998.  The Southern components biological history has only been known since 1984, 
and this spawning stock was in 1998 estimated to 800.000 tonnes (Iversen, 2001).  
 
The fishery 
Prior to the end of the 1960's, the mackerel fishery only amounted to a small percentage 
compared to the total herring landings from the Northeast Atlantic (Lockwood, 1988). 
According to Lockwood (1988), the mackerel in European context, served in the 
beginning of the century as either an unsought by catch, and as an alternative when the 
herring catches were low. However, there was in the post war a period considerable 
technological advance, both with regards to seine technology and trawl technology 
(Lockwood, 1988). The Dutch started a new pelagic spring trawl fishery for mackerel in 
the northeast in the North Sea in the 1950's. The Dutch contributed to a considerable 
increase in the total landings. However, the catch per effort by the Dutch pelagic trawl 
fleet was declining, and this was the result of the technical advantage of the purse seine 
fleet of the Norwegians. The invention of the power block greatly simplified the hauling 
of the seines, and combined with the single boat shooting developed by the Icelandic 
greatly increased the catching power by the seine vessels (Lockwood, 1988). The effort 
was mainly directed towards the herring fishery, but as the story goes, from 1966 the 
caches of herring declined, and finally collapsed, both in the Atlanto- Scanidian (The 
Icelandic herring fishery) and then in the North Sea (Lockwood, 1988). Following these 
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events, the catch of mackerel increased from a total international level of less than 200 
000 tonnes in 1964 to over 1 million tonnes by 1967. Of which Norway took over 85 
percent (Lockwood, 1988).  
Most of the Norwegian mackerel fishery today is conducted in the second half of the year. 
Today, Norway gets 31 percent of the TAC within the zones of the EU and Norway, these 
negotiations started in 1978 (Pehrson and Ramsli, 1998). There has not been an agreed 
quota in all years, in 1982-87 there was not set a TAC north of 62o (Department of 
Fisheries, 1998). Some of the TAC is to be caught in the Faeroes zone, but the main 
fishery is conducted in the North Sea, where the quota in 2001 was set to 159.930 tonnes 
of the total 176.370 tonnes (Fiskeridirektøren, 2001a). During the second half of the year, 
the components are mixed in the North Sea, but in the winter months the western 
component migrates from this area. Therefore it is not recommended to fish in the North 
Sea February to august as mainly the depleted North Sea component remains (ICES, 
2001). From the early summer months, the mackerel migrates close to the Norwegian 
coastline and into the fjords. The Western and North Sea component has been of most 
importance to the Norwegian mackerel fishery (Iversen, 2001), now the western 
component makes up approximately 71-86 percent of the North East Atlantic mackerel 











Figure 3.2. The development in Norwegian total catch and first hand values. Numbers collected 
by Pehrson and Ramsli (1998) table A8, and from Fiskeridepartementet (St.meld. 51,1998), 
appendix 3, table 3.9, Norges Fiskarlag, 2001, table 5,20, and Fiskeridirektoratet, 2001(Referat fra 
Reguleringsrådet). 
 
The mackerel fishery has since the 1960s been conducted mainly by seine, trawl, driftnet, 
land locked seine and trolling. The trend has been that conventional gear such as drift net, 
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trolling and land locked seine has decreased in relative importance. Mainly the smaller 
vessels conduct gill net fishing and trolling (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). In the county 
of Møre and Romsdal these conventional gear is little present so is also the use of trawl. 
The same was the pattern north of Møre and Romsdal. Use of traditional gear (land locked 
coastal seine, gill net, and trolling) has mainly been used in the more southern counties 












Figure 3.3. The calculated percentage share of catch by the gear type from 1960-2000. Numbers 
from 1960-1980 are based on Pehrson and Ramsli (1998) collected from Fisheries Statistics 1960-
1988. Numbers from 1993 based on statistics from Norges Sildesalgslag Annual reports, 1994-
2000. And on numbers from Fiskeridepartementet (St.meld.51,1998) appendix 3 in table 3,9.  
 
From this figure it is evident that the type of gear dominating the fishery dramatically 
changed within few years. The coastal seines have become increasingly important in the 
coastal mackerel fishery. However it is worth noting that some of the numbers from early 
years are missing, so it does not draw a complete accurate picture, but it does however 
show the major trends. 
 
 
New markets and increasing value 
Most of the purse seine catches was at first landed for reduction, it took almost 20 years 
before purse seine catches were mainly for consumption (Pehrson and Ramsli, 1998). The 
main market is the Japanese, where mackerel receives high prices. The national market 
for mackerel is and was modest, and for frozen mackerel to be exported large investments 
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in land based freezer facilities was necessary. The Japanese market is in particular 
interested in mackerel caught from September to November and over 600grams (Pehrson 
and Ramsli, 1998). According to Perhson and Ramsli (1998), 1985 presented a new era in 
the export of mackerel for consumption, this was the beginning of the end for mackerel 
for reduction. Now less than 0,2 percent of total catch value is from meal and oil 
production (Norges Sildesalgslag, 2000). In 1968 over 80 percent of the total value was 
from industrial use (Based on numbers collected by Pehrson and Ramsli, 1998). The 
Japanese mackerel catches had been declining since the 1980s, and Norway was able to 
deliver large sized mackerel of excellent quality (Pehrson, and Ramsli, 1998). The coastal 
caught mackerel has also landed for frozen export, but in recent years the coastal fishers 
have had to deliver to Russian freezer ships due to capacity problems in the land facilities 
(Fiskaren, 3/12-02). Though the total catches over the years have considerably been 
reduced, the developments in value have compensated significantly (see fig 3.1).  
 
Beginning the Regulations 
By 1973, the Norwegian Purse Seine fleet was to be subject to licensing and thus begins 
the story of limited access in the Norwegian mackerel fishery. This was formalised in the 
Participation act of 1972 witch replaced the Ownership act. The use of licences to control 
access and to prevent further increase in the capacity was thus legally formalised (Apostle 
et al, 1999). The Licence Committee (Konsesjonsutvalget) of 1972 regulated the issues of 
capacity and politics concerning the fishing fleet, the regulation committee (Regulerings 
utvalget) of 1973, was concerned with the size of the catches (Christensen and 
Hallenstvedt, 19847). In the case of allocating the TAC between the gear groups, the 
interest organisations seemed to be most important, and that the percentage to the gear 
groups reflects the position between the seine and conventional gear between the herring 
interests (Mikalsen and Sagdahl, 19828 ). The allocation of allowable catch according to 
region was conducted centrally at the Directorate in Bergen (Nordstrand, 2000). The 
principle of allocation was that of fairness and equity (Christensen and Hallenstvedt, 
1984). According to Nordstrand (2000) the allocations were based on the balancing of 
historical rights, allocation according to region, gear groups and companies, in addition to 
considerations to quality and continuous access for the onshore production sites 
                                                           
7 In Nordstrand (2000) 
8 In Nordstrand (2000) 
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(Nordstrand, 2000). From the mid 1960's interests associated with the Boat Owner 
Organisation (Fiskebåtredernes Fellesforening) had on several occasion indicated that 
they wanted a reduction of the purse seine vessels, this was repeated by the Seine 
fishermen organisation (Notfiskarsamskipnaden) in 1972 (Norsk Fiskerinæring, 2001). 
The Participation act may be considered a response to the interests that the existing fleet 
had in the herring fisheries. Other accounts regard this act as the outcome, which was 
initiated by the Fisheries Director in Bergen. According to Nordstrand (2000) the 
regulations in the beginning was concerned with protecting the stocks, but rather they 
were regulations according to who were allowed to own fishing vessels, and acts like the 
Trawler act were implemented according to social considerations. According to 
Nordstrand (2000) the Directorate initiated the regulation of the offshore Purse Seine 
fishery in the North sea already in 1967 three years after this fishery had started, and that 
these regulations came as a response to the condition of the stock and the market situation. 
The high level of catches in the North Sea industrial fishery coincided with high catches 
in the industrial fisheries in Peru and Chile and that this lead to a reduction in price to 1/3 
of the prior first hand price in the market (Nordstrand, 2000) (see figure 3.2). In 1977, it 
was decided that the Purse Seines were not allowed to fish south of 60oN. This lead to 
massive protests and 100 seine vessels gathered in Bergen to mark their protest (Norsk 
Fiskerinæring, 2001). This was a measurement in order to protect the North Sea 
component of the mackerel, which had severely declined. In 1977, Norway adopted the 
200 nautical mile exclusive fisheries zone, and according to Apostle et al (1998) this was 
the start of the present resource management regime. Under the provision of the Laws of 
the Seas, (LOSC, art. 56(1) , “the State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the fish stocks of the zone”. And “the coastal State shall 
establish the total allowable catch” (TAC) (LOSC, art.61 (1)). The Law of the Seas also laid 
a responsibility by the states that share stocks to come to agreements concerned the 
common management. With fish stocks becoming a national common property, the state 
had prerogative and opportunity to control the fisheries within its zone and exclude 
foreign vessels. The international negotiations over shared stocks are amongst other 
things based on historical rights. 
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The Formal Organisation of Representation 
The Regulatory Council 
The Regulatory Council (formed in 1983 though an amendment of the Salt Water Fishing 
Act) is the formal arena for representatives of interest organisations participating in the 
management system. These are mainly industry interests. This replaced the two other 
councils that were mentioned in the previous section. The Regulatory Council meets twice 
a year, and is held by the Fisheries Director at the Fisheries Directorate in Bergen. The 
Director prepares the agenda. The Regulatory Council has status as an advisory board to 
the Minister of Fisheries in the Ministry of Fisheries in Oslo who has the ultimate 
authority to write out new regulations under the provision of the laws. In addition to the 
full-fledged members with the right to vote, there are a number of advisors who are 
scientists and representatives from the sales organisations. A number of diverse interests 
are also granted status as observers, mainly employees at the Directorate and the 
Department. The Participant Act is the legal frame for who may participate in the fishery 
and the Salt Water Fishing Act is the legal frame for regulations of gear types, closed 
seasons and areas, setting the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and more. It is also practice 
to send proposals for regulatory and legal change out on “hearing”, in which most of the 
interested organisations and agencies may express their views (Apostle et al, 1998, Jentoft 
and Mikalsen, 2001). 
 
The Norwegian Fishermen's Association  
The Norwegian Fishermen's Association was founded in 1926 and is the largest 
fishermen's interest organisation. It consists of regional county groups, but from the 1960s 
specialised group organisations such as the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association 
(Fiskebåtredernes Forbund, founded in 1946 by purse seine pioneers), and The 
Seinefishermens Association (Sør Norges Notfiskarlag) became members of the 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association. Through county branches or the functional group 
organisations, the members channel their requests and demands. The Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association has an Executive Board and the Annual Meeting where 
important proposals are debated and voted over. The representatives of the Executive 
Board are from the northern and southern regions and from the Boat Owners Association 
(2001). The representatives on the Annual Meeting are from all the county branches and 
the functional group organisations. These member organisations have their own Executive 
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Boards and Annual Meetings, and have certain autonomy. However, the groups vary in 
both membership numbers and numbers of representatives on the national level. County 
groups have one representative on the national Annual Meeting for each 300 member 
(2001). The Norwegian Fishermen's Association is represented at the national Regulatory 
Council (established in 1983) as the only fishermen's organisation with full rights. The 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association appoints committees to work on central issues, such 
as the Resource Allocation Committee (Fiskeridirektøren, 2001, Apostle et al, 1998, Hoel 
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Chapter 4: The 1994 Allocation Key 
 
The situational context 
In 1990 the Norwegian Fishermen's Association appointed a work group to look into a 
possibility of a long-term allocation key for the pelagic fisheries. The Resource Allocation 
Committee handed in their report in 1991, where it was underscored that its 
representational position in the management system required united fishermen standing 
by the advice of the organisation (Norges Fiskarlag, 1991). As a response to the internal 
conflicts over annual allocations between the different fleet segments, the Resource 
Allocation Committee promoted an allocation scheme to provide stability (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 1991). The purse seine group expressed concerns that the coastal and trawl 
group gradually had been given larger shares of the quota, and that they would not stand 
for this (Norges Fiskarlag, 1991). This Resource Allocation Committee found it 
preferable to let allocations be based on historical catches, and regarded that one would by 
not emphasising regional distribution give equal opportunities disregarding place of 
residence. However, only in 1994 a real effort was aimed at implementing a long-term 
allocation key in the mackerel fisheries.  
 
1994 was a special year for all Norwegians and perhaps in particular for the fishermen. 
This was the year of the EU referendum, and the year the European Economic Area 
agreement went into force. This was an adaptation to the European market. With the 
implementation of the European Economic Area agreement, the Main Agreement of 1964 
for the annual negotiations for financial transfers between the state and fishermen would 
significantly be altered. Securing fishermen's incomes by price subsidy would under the 
European Economic Area agreement be considered as disruptive for competition and thus 
against its principle. Price and catches are the main factors that dictates the income of 
fishermen. With price subsidies being illegal, the dependency of market price and quota 
share would be increasingly important for the economic viability of the fisheries. An 
attempt to introduce an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system had in 1991 been 
flatly rejected by the industry and the Parliament (see i.e. Hersoug et al, 1999). However, 
with the proposed ITQ system, the signal was that the government opted for less 
involvement in the question of allocations. 
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The 1994 Resource Allocation Report  
In July 1994 an external expert work group put forward their report to the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association. This expert group had been given the mandate to address and 
discusses criterions for a long-term allocation key in several fisheries. This was to provide 
a basis for the forthcoming Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association in 
which the allocation key would materialise from. In the following I will present their 
work and analysis, and the final allocation key that the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association proposed. 
 
According to Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) any re allocation in quotas must be argued 
in line with the expressed goals of the fisheries policies. However, Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) points out that in the Norwegian context, the management regime has 
been most concerned whether the catches have been on a sensible level and that the 
capacity in the feet segment of the industry be reduced. A reason why fisheries economic 
arguments have not been prominent was according to Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) that 
the Norwegian fisheries policy cannot be understood as directed central governance. 
Rather the management has been a series of “historical compromises” between different 
parts of the industry, organisations and central authorities. According to Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) there has never been an explicit definition of high economic yield as a 
goal and the allocation effect is a characteristic trait of the management system. The 
policy goals recognised by Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) were mainly that patterns of 
settlements should be conserved, the resources protected, jobs should be stable and safe 
and the real profitability in the industry should increase. Similar to most policy objectives, 
these reflect contradicting goals, the practical approach to the debate is on the weighting 
of conflicting goals and interests (Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994).  
 
In the discussion concerned with allocation of quotas, the report by Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) found factors related to employment and recruitment, settlement 
(regional concerns), biological/ecological and historic shares to be relevant. These are not 
specific to the mackerel fishery, but reflect a general situation in the fisheries 
management. According to Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) claims for interest to 
participate may be based on these principles, and referring to these them could serve for 
the purpose of legitimising political decisions.   
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With regards to both employment opportunities, securing jobs Paulsen and Steinshamn 
(1994) recommended no significant alteration of the allocation. This was with regards to 
total industry employment, job security, and year round operation and opportunities for 
new recruits.  With regard to regional and settlement considerations, Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) interpreted the policy statements in that the main pattern of settlement 
was to be continued, and meaning larger geographical areas such as regions and counties. 
Their recommendation on this account was that the historical pattern for by region and 
county should be continued. Furthermore Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) recommended 
that vessels without onboard production to be prioritised, along with priority of vessel 
groups residing in fisheries dependent regions. With regard to economic considerations, 
Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) did not give any recommendations. Rather they reflected 
over the different perspectives and possible implications of a purely business economic 
and a more general social economic perspective. On the other hand, in a purely business 
economic perspective, the capital costs and management costs and with environmental 
considerations the smaller vessels should be prioritised. According to Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994), the social economic and business economic goals would coincide if 
the unemployment level in general were low. Though they made no clear 
recommendations to the economic question, Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) further 
discussed management tools to prevent economic over fishing, the pros and cons of 
limiting access trough licences, taxation and transferable quotas. As a result of the 
difficulties with regards to what economic performance constitutes, along with factors 
such as unemployment levels, it seems that Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) were unable 
to make any clear recommendations. Thus again this would leave the issue open of 
considerable political debate. With regards to biological and ecological considerations, the 
general recommendation of Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) was that the most size 
selective and species selective vessel types should be prioritised, at least until 
multispecies management is better developed. 
 
As a final issue to be considered as important for the allocation, Paulsen and Steinshamn 
(1994) discussed the question of historical shares. According to Paulsen and Steinshamn 
(1994) the strong position of this argument had to be understood in relation to the 
importance of the fisheries along the coast. When the question of whom will participate, 
the quantity and fishing patterns, the allocation may be based on historical shares. Thus it 
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may be argued the dependency and harvest over a long historical period constitutes a basis 
for claiming customary and grandfather rights. Further, Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) 
states that if historical shares is to be maintained as a objective in it self, than the time 
period from which allocation rights should follow should be defined first. Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) underscored the necessity of defining historical rights. These rights 
may be coupled to individuals, vessel groups or geographical areas. According to Paulsen 
and Steinshamn (1994), the geographical rights would meet the settlement criterion 
mentioned above. When it came to linking historical rights to individuals or vessel 
groups, this implies that the allocations should follow the prior share of quota or catch of 
the actors (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). This means that one would have to decide 
which fishermen or vessel groups have historical rights. The problem as Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) points out is that the total fleet composition, resource base and activity 
patterns have changed significantly over the last decades. According to Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) this would make it difficult to tie specific customary rights to 
individuals and vessel groups and thus they recommend that the time period not be longer 
than the last 10-15 years. Furthermore, what should the content of historical rights be 
based on? Should the historical rights be linked to quotas or share to single species or be 
adapted to a broader economics of different fisheries? The advantages as Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) points out are that the latter allows for more flexibility and that the 
fishermen be less dependent specific species. On the other hand this would probably give 
the authorities less predictability and more difficulty in allocation between the 
participants. Also, should rights relate to historical catch or quota shares?   
 
According to Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994), differences between actual catch and quota 
might yield relative different stakes for the different participants. Thus a discrepancy 
between catch and quota shares would need to be addressed in order to decide which 
principle to use. In sum Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) states that using historical shares 
means that it must be clarified which actors have which rights and one must decide 
whether allocations be based on historical catch or quota shares. Paulsen and Steinshamn 
(1994) could se how this might be a problem in achieving consensus to the principle for 
allocation.  
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Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) found two more practical reasons to why historical shares 
should be the principle in the decision of allocations, First as an allocation of catch levels 
by today's participants will create less conflict than that of an allocation based on other 
principles. Historical shares might form a basis for compromise, as it is a simple criterion. 
Indirectly this would also lead obtaining the goal of settlement and employment 
opportunity. Second, the quota allocation was also the central condition had most 
significance in the participant's previous dispositions with regards to investments, choice 
of fishing pattern and occupation (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). Thus according to 
Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) an allocation based on previous catch would secure the 
stability in the industry in that the previous adaptation by participants would not diverge 
much from future needs. 
 
However, the report by Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) stated that cementing the pattern 
of harvest, vessel structure and business form would in a long-term perspective be 
unfortunate. This as some flexibility is required as the resource base fluctuates, 
availability changes, technology develops and markets alter. Further Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) reckoned that a quota allocation the industry regarded as permanent 
would reduce the legitimacy of the management regime. In their (Paulsen and 
Steinshamn, 1994) view the limitations in access and harvesting rights had been accepted 
as they were considered as means to solve crisis or transitional phases. Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) imply that if the resource situation improved this might lead 
participants to accept the allocation of rights that would lead to elements of ownership 
(property) rights of the resources through a more permanent allocation to particular vessel 
groups (see Hersough et al 1999, path dependency). Therefore the allocation between 
vessel groups should not be so withstanding as to fisheries resources as a common 
property resource could be questioned (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). With a strong 
emphasis to the historical shares of catch, then what would the proposed allocation key 
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The allocation of mackerel prior to 1994 
With regard to the allocation between the different fleet groups, the historical catch or 













Fig. 4.1 Based on numbers from table 3,9 in St.meld 51, appendix 3. In the years between 1982-
1987, there was no set quota north of 62o, and The SUK group (seines without licence) between 
21,35-27,5m was in 1980-1983 regulated under the coastal group south of 62o, from 1986 all 
SUK vessels was regulated under the purse seine group, defined as vessels over 21,35m fishing 
with seine. The coastal group quota was stipulated only. Coastal group is here defined as vessels 
under 21,35m, seine and conventional gear. The trawlers catch and quotas are not presented here.  
 
As it is evident from fig 4.1, using historical quota would constitute some difficulties, as 
there was considerable difference between theoretical quota and actual catch during most 
of the 1980s. After 1988, the difference between catch and quota is not significant. The 
coastal group quota was stipulated, based on the catches in previous years. The increase in 
the catch in the purse seine group is explained by increasing quotas, but also by the 
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Figure 4.2,The catch and the quotas by the type of vessel group (gear group) calculations based on 
numbers from St. Meld 51, Appendix 3 table 3,9 (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998). Again, there was 
no set quota north of 62o between 1980-1983. 
 
By examining the percentage catch by fleet group from 1980 including 1994 (Fig 4,1) it is 
evident that the allocation of catch between the groups has been quite stable. However the 
purse seine group got from 1984 a slightly larger share of the catches, and from then had a 
share over 80 percent. It is worth noting from 1986 all SUK (seines without licence) 
vessels were regulated with the purse seines. Previously these had been managed as a 
coastal group (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998). This may explain the drop in the coastal share 
from 24 percent in 1981 to less than 7 percent in 1986. Since then the coastal group had a 
percentage share of catch less than 10 percent on average. However, if the average is 
calculated based on numbers from 1980 without discriminating the seine vessels without 
licence, the coastal groups has had an average quota of 18 percent, and catch average of 
12 percent. The trawl share is not presented here, but according to the numbers in St.meld. 
51 (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998), the trawl share had been from zero and up to less than 3 
percent. This is inconsistent of what was presented in the report by Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) who calculated the trawl share to approximately 5 percent! Thus the 
purse seine share after 1988 was approximately 89 percent. In the report Paulsen and 
Steinshamn (1994) indicated the time period of 10-15 years should be used in the 
discussion over historical shares, however they did not specify how the transition of the 
seine vessels without licence vessels (SUK) should be treated. What this implies is that 
depending on numbers chosen, calculations may vary somewhat. Thus there is 
considerable room for interpretations that may differ depending on point of view.   
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Development by region and fleet structure 
With regard to the developments in regional allocation, there has been notable difference 













Figure 4.3, based on numbers from St.meld. 51 (1997-98). These are catches landed by vessels 
according to their home county. The figure also shows the development after 1994. 
 
From figure 4.3, two counties, Møre and Romsdal (M&R) and Hordaland stand out in 
particular, with having a considerable share of the mackerel catches landed by vessels 
from their counties. Also, the three northern most counties have had a different 
development than the other counties. Northern Norway has had a positive development in 
the share of mackerel catches that no other counties have. What used to be traditional 
mackerel areas (under remaining) and Rogaland has had a negative development in the 
share over mackerel catches. In Paulsen and Steinshamn's report (1994), the geographical 
allocation is presented in percent by county, which illustrates a slightly different picture. 
During this time period (1980-1994) the total catch increased from 77 000 tonnes to 260 
000 tonnes. The share of Møre and Romsdal was reduced whilst the Sogn and Fjordande 
and south (including Hordaland) got an increasing share along with the Northern most 
counties. In 1990 Hordaland had 27 purse seine vessels, and Møre and Romsdal had 40. 
This was a reduction from 1980 by 25 vessels (or 41%) in Møre and Romsdal, however 
the total capacity in hecto litres (hl) only reduced with 14 percent from 1980-1990. 
(Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994,pp26). As Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) points out, the 
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total numbers of purse seine vessels was halved from 1970-1980, but without the total 
capacity being higher in the 1970s.  
 
By studying the pattern of how the fishery has been conducted and how the fleet has 
developed we might get some additional information to understanding the result of the 
allocations in 1994 and where special interests have lied. For the purse seine fleet, defined 
as seine vessels more than 28m the development was that the numbers of vessels more 
than halved in the period between 1980-1990. However the number of vessels in the 
largest category with the capacity of 10000million hl increased (Table 5,1 pp 25 in 
Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). The larger purse seine vessels, vessels over 28m 
(including the SUK vessels between 70-90feet) take the main part of the fishery. Gillnet 
was only used by vessels less than 28m, and trawl only by vessels over 28m. (Paulsen and 
Steinshamn, 1994). In the northern most counties almost all mackerel is fished by purse 
seines larger than 28m. In Møre and Romsdal seine is the most important gear but then 
also by vessels less than 28m. Though there had been a general reduction in both numbers 
of seine vessels and capacity from 1980-1990, neither was significant in Hordaland and 
Møre and Romsdal. As mentioned earlier the later development toward 1990 was that the 
numbers of larger vessels had increased (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). Benefits from 
larger units had increased the profitability of this fleet, but the reduction of capacity was 
not so successful if decrease in numbers of vessels were the instrument for capacity 
reduction (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). In the case of industrial trawls, which may 
participate in the mackerel fishery, the numbers of vessels had decreased by 41 percent. 
However, the total capacity in brut tonnes actually increased from 1980-1992 by 11 
percent. The most important industrial trawl counties is Rogaland, Hordaland and Møre 
and Romsdal, these counties had a reduction in numbers of vessels from 1990-1992. 
Mackerel has not been significant contributor in their total economy (Paulsen and 
Steinshamn, 1994). Coastal seine may be defined in two groups, vessels between 13-
25,9m and vessels under 13m, according to Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994), 5-15 percent 
of their pelagic catches are based on mackerel, herring is most important. According to 
Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) the development in number of vessels in this group over 
13m between 1980 and 1992 did not exhibit any typical trend, but that the tendency has 
been an increase in capacity. In the smallest vessel group participating, those under 13m 
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had from 1981-1991 increased from 15-50 (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994).  
 
The resulting allocation key 
The Allocation key that came out of the Annual Meeting in 1994 the Norwegian 














Figure 4.4 Is based on the percentage shares to the different groups, the coastal quota was set as a 
stipulated quota, of 20.000 tonnes, the trawl group share is 2 percent, but for quotas over 300.000 
tonnes their share would increase to 3 percent. The Remaining is allotted to the purse seine group 
included the SUK vessels. From the numbers in the Resource Allocation Committee of 2001 
(Norges Fiskarlag, 2001) 
 
The figure (4.4) shows that with an increasing total allowable catch (TAC) the share of 
the coastal group would progressively become smaller and the purse seine quota share 
would develop in the opposite direction. In situations of an increasing TAC this would 
mean that mainly the purse seine fleet (including seine vessels without licence, SUK) 
would benefit, the stipulated quota of 20.000 tonnes to the coastal group would remain. 
However, vessels in this group using conventional gear should have their caches from the 
coastal group quota, but should be allowed to continue to fish even if this had all been 
caught (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). This allocation was to be the basis of the allocation in 
the period from 1995-2001. With the average quota of approximately 200 thousand tonnes 
from 1990-1994, a coastal group quota of 20.000 tonnes would constitute approximately 
10 percent. Thus, the quota to the purse seine and SUK would be 88 percent at this quota 
 












20 70 120 170 220 270















                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                         36




level. The size of the quota is as mentioned in chapter 3, dependent on the negotiations 
with the EU and the Faeroes over the western stock component in addition to stock 
development. The North Sea stock has since the 1970s shown no sign of recovery (se fig. 
3.1). But also mentioned in chapter 3, the development in value was positive and might be 
a reason for optimism in the fishery. In the next chapter I shall present what the 
experiences of the 1994 allocation key up to the time of revision in 2001. And under this 
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Chapter 5: The 2001 Allocation Key 
 
The experience from 1994 
The allocation proposed in the mackerel fisheries was presented in the previous chapter. 
Now I shall review the experiences with from 1995, which was presented in the report by 
the Resource Allocation Committee (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). With a long-term scheme 
in place for the allocation of mackerel between the different fleet segments, and with 
prospects of further limitations in participation in the fishery, the Norwegian Fisherman’s 
Association seemed to have come to a satisfactory situation. However, this was not to be 
the case. In most cases the Departments would not follow through the recommendations 
by the Fishermen's association. Shares to the offshore fleets generally followed the 
recommendations, with a slightly higher share to the trawlers. In September 1996 the 
Minister of Fisheries decided to stop the fishery for all groups in the coastal fishery. With 
this new situation the coastal fleet wanted compensation, and the discussion was then to 
where this compensation would come from. According to the 2001 report (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 2001) the coastal fleet argued for a larger share of the TAC (Total Allowable 
Catch), which other interests, offshore, opposed by arguing that this was not the intention 
of the 1994 agreement and that the coastal group quota should be reallocated with no 
transfers from offshore.  
 
In 1997 the Executive Board in the Norwegian Fisherman’s Association appointed a 
working group to deal with the division in the coastal fleet between the conventional 
vessels and seine vessels less than 13 with the remaining coastal seines. Unable to come 
to a unanimous proposition, the case was treated “organisationally” (Fiskarlaget, 2001). 
Again in 1998 a work group was set to resolve the situation in the coastal group, and 
again this had to be treated “organisationally”. An allocation of 20.000 tonnes was first 
decided, but based on protests the case was reconsidered and the coastal quota was set to 
25.000 tonnes. The department set the group quota to 30.000 tonnes.  
 
Prior to 1999 the regulations were only determined in a preliminary regulation for the first 
half of the year.  Again the department set the coastal group quota higher than the 
recommended by the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. Also in 1999 and 2000 the 
Department set the coastal group quota to 30.000 tonnes, 5.000 tonnes more than what the 
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Norwegian Fishermen's Association recommended. This quantity was taken from the 
offshore purse seine quota (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). 
 
How was the fishery? 
In this section I shall give a review over the development relevant for the mackerel fishery 
after the allocation key was implemented in 1995. Quota shares have not followed the 
key, but relevant is also the development in the resource base and markets. The catches 
have been slightly higher than the quota in the trawler and purse seine group. The coastal 
group did not fish their quota in 1995 and in 1998, but have in the other years slightly 
exceeded their quota. In 1996 that was a special year, the coastal group exceeded their 
quota by 1000 tonnes. This was also the year the fishery was stopped in this group in 
September (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001, Table 5.19).  It may not be possible to say how the 
allocation key has had regional consequences by examining figure 4.3 in chapter 4.But 
one may interpret that the southern counties along the Skagerrak coast benefited from the 
high availability of mackerel in 1996. 













Figure 5.1Based on values from the Directorate, economic and biological key figures from the 
Norwegian fisheries, table 2.  And catch from the resource allocation committee table 5,2. Catch 
size from Fisheries Director 2001 (Reguleringsrådet), Value calculated with the average price 8,2 
kr in week 37, 2001, Fiskaren October 3rd. This was the highest price this year, thus somewhat 
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The total catches had remained relative stable, with an average now of 160,5 thousand 
tonnes, a fall of 40 thousand tonnes from the 1990-1994 average. The total average value 
on the other hand, was in the previous period 500 million kr, and from 1995-2000 
approximately 926 million kr. A drop in price for purse seines catches caused the drop in 
value from 1997 to 1998 (Norges Sildesalgslag, 1998). According to Pehrson and Ramsli 
(1998) this was mainly due to a significant fall in the price for frozen mackerel in Japan 
and in the export market for Norwegian mackerel in general. Since then, the value has 
again increased. On average, the offshore caught mackerel received a higher price than 
the coastal mackerel, with exception of the mackerel caught by driftnet. In 1998, this 
mackerel received average prices over 12 kr/kg and the offshore mackerel for 
consumption 5,5 kr/kg. However the driftnet mackerel quantum was only 300 tonnes 
(Norges Sildesalgslag, 1996-2000). 2001 was a good year for the mackerel fishery, export 
increased mainly due to increased demands in Eastern Europe, the export value of 
mackerel was 2,39 billion kr the most economical important pelagic species for export 
(Norges Sildesalgslag, 2000). 
 












Figure 5.2. The actual percentage allocation of catch between the different fleet groups according 
to quota. Based on table 5.20 in the Resource Allocation Committee (2001). For 2001, figures 
from Fisheries Director (2001) case 18/01: The regulation for mackerel 2002, table 1. 
 
From the figure 5.2 the adjusted quotas from 1998 to the coastal group was taken from the 
purse seine group. However, as the group quota is set at 30.000 tonnes and not as a 
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percentage, the slight increase in TAC (see fig. 5.1) was in total allocated to the purse 
seine fleet. In the meeting at the Regulatory Council in 2000, the Coastal Fishermen's 
Association expressed their discontent that only the purse seine fleet benefited from an 
increased quota (Fiskeridirektøren, 2000).  
 
The 2001 Report from the Resource Allocation Committee 
In 1999, the Executive Board of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association appointed a 
working group that was to follow up on the 1994 decision on the Allocation keys in the 
fisheries. In January the working group, the Resource Allocation Committee, presented 
their work that was an analysis of the experiences with the allocation keys from 1994 
along with recommendations to new keys. In addition the Resource allocation committee 
addressed the issue of access to the fisheries for the coastal groups (se chapter 6). The 
working group consisted of 4 members from the Northern co-operation area, 2 from the 
Southern area and 2 from the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association. These would appoint 
the Managing Director, Johannes M Nakken, of the Herring Sales organisation to lead the 
work. The committee was assisted by a secretariat. 
 
The recommendations resulted after several meetings between the members of the 
committee, and meetings with representatives of the Department of Fisheries, the South- 
Norway Trawler association and the county membership groups. The recommendations 
were unanimous. However, with regards to the duration of the allocations some initial 
problems were revealed. The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association had, on a prior 
occasion as a part of the conditions for their continued membership in the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association, demanded that the allocation between offshore and coast 
become permanent. The Executive Board of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association 
responded in a language which led the Northern co-operation area threaten to withdrawal 
from the committee work. (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). The committee requested a 
clarification to the mandate. The work continued, and the Committee agreed that the 
allocations would last for 6 years (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). 
 
The recommendations were that the coastal fleet (vessels under 21,35m) should have 17 
percent of the total quota, but that at a total quota less than 147,060 tonnes the coast 
would have a set quota of 25.000tonnes. The Trawlers should have 3 percent, and the 
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Purse seines would have the remaining. Of the Purse seines the SUK (seines without 
licence) should have 8,2 percent. This deviated some from the 1994 allocation, and the 
reason the committee gave for this was that the rationale for a stipulated quota for the 
coastal group had been altered since 1994 in relation to the dispensation for parts of this 
group. Thus, the committee found it reasonable that the coastal group also followed a 
percentage plan so that this group follows the variation of the TAC (Total Allowable 
Catch). The percent was set to 17, as this was the current share of the quota. And 
furthermore the committee found it reasonable that the coastal group be guaranteed a 
minimum quota of 25.000 tonnes. 
 
As the committee found that the seine vessels without licence (SUK) benefited from 
structural adjustments in the licensed purse seine fleet, it was reasonable that the SUK 
vessels be singled out as a separate group. These could possible go into a structure group 
along with other vessels between 21-27,99m. Furthermore the committee found it 
reasonable to set the trawlers share to 3 percent independent on the variations in TAC. 
 
As in the 1994 report by Paulsen and Steinshamn, this committee was to do their 
evaluations and recommendations according to criterions that were considered important. 
Again these reflect the problematic issue of weighting contradicting goals against each 
other. The political guidelines stated in the Stortingsmelding 51 (Fiskeridepartementet, 
1998) reflects this, where the objective of the government. The government objective is 
that the politics should work for a profitable development in the fishing industry based on 
a management that is sustainable. Further, according to the report (Fiskeridepartementet, 
1998) the means to secure employment and settlement along the coast is by market 
orientation and increase added value. But in addition to this, the government regards that a 
varied fleet with main emphasis on the coastal fleet is part of a strategy to ensure goals for 
regional development (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998). The government also stated that the 
allocations must be such that the total ability to compete on the international market is 
increased (Fiskeridepartementet, 1998). The government emphasised increased 
profitability throughout the entire document. As in the 1994 report by Paulsen and 
Steinshamn, the point of historical rights and participation was again addressed. Again, in 
the analysis but the 2001 Resource Allocation Committee regarded historical catches to be 
the preferable principle by which to allocate the quotas. This was based on a notion that 
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this would be least controversial. In addition, the committee regarded this as an 
appropriate means in which employment and regional patterns were maintained.  
 
The Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fisherman's Association October 2001: before, 
during and after.  
Before the report from the Resource Allocation Committee was published the debate over 
quotas started in the media. In particular the South-Norway Trawler Association (Sør-
Norges Trålerlag) was active. They had received 5 million kr in support from the 
Rogaland county administration to 50 of their trawlers who were in a financial tight spot. 
At the same time the leader from the Resource Allocation Committee, Johannes Nakken, 
warned the trawler group not to be to expect too much from the allocation (Stavanger 
Aftenblad, 12/12-00). With the proposal of the Resource Allocation Committee, the 
managing director in the South-Norway Trawler Association stated that the battle over the 
mackerel quotas was not over, in their view the trawlers should have 5 percent and not 3 
as proposed (Stavanger Aftenblad 1/2-01). The leader in the South-Norway Trawler 
Association claimed it was not fair that the total quota of the trawlers were less than what 
some purse seine vessels alone had further north on the west coast (Stavanger Aftenblad, 
6/2-01). In Fiskaren (31/3-01) the leader of the South-Norway Trawler Association stated 
that if the trawlers were to be heard during the Annual Meeting in the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association, the Ministry would have to act. The trawler situation was 
addressed in Parliament (Fiskaren, 8/5-01). On May 9th Fiskaren reports that the Minister 
of Fisheries, Otto Gregussen, will not reallocate the mackerel quota, at least until after the 
Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. The organisation for small 
seine vessels (Rederiforeningen for ringnotbåter under 70fot) also felt that they had lost 
out in the mackerel quotas. But the Minister stated that the allocation key had broad 
support in the industry (Fiskaren, 9/5-01).  
 
In January 2001 the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association (Fiskabåtredernes Forbund) 
held a general assembly where the payment of resource rent were amongst the issues to be 
discussed with the Minister of Fisheries, Otto Gregussen (Labour party) present. Prior to 
this meeting, the general secretary of the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association, Audun 
Maråk stated that it would be out of the question to pay resource rent unless the fisheries 
policy was such that the profitability in the fleet could increase. Thus the quota share 
                                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                         43




should remain stable at the current level (Fiskaren 9/1-01). In January the report from the 
Resource Allocation Committee was published, and Fiskaren reported of an unanimous 
Committee and a content leader of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association stated that the 
Norwegian Vessel Owner Association would no longer have reason to leave the 
organisation (Fiskaren, 31/1-01). According to Fiskaren, the purse seine vessel owner’s 
stated that they could not spare even one fish, and their organisation threaten to leave the 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association in favour of NHO (who organises Norwegian 
employers). The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association said it would do so unless the 
proposal by the Resource Allocation Committee was accepted on the Annual Meeting 
(Fiskaren, 3/10-01). The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association was during the Annual 
Meeting reminded that there are no private property rights to the fisheries resources 
(Fiskaren, 15/10-01).  
 
On December 27th 2000 Fiskaren reported the reduction of maximum quota in the coastal 
mackerel group would mean a reduction of 125.000kr to the crews on the small vessels. 
After the report from the Allocation Committee had been publisher, the Committee leader 
Johannes Nakken said that though it was a new principle to have set quotas the division of 
the coastal into more homogenous groups would be more fair (Fiskaren, 31/1-01).  On 
October 3rd the region south group (Fiskarlaget Sør) puts forward the demand of 20 
percent to the coastal group, they accuse fishermen from the purse seine fleet of being 
greedy by fishing in the coastal group on their spare time (Fiskaren, 3/10-01). The county 
group organisations were also faced with threats of members leaving the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association. According to Fiskaren, the coastal fishermen had ambitions for 
reallocation for the 2001 Annual Meeting (Fiskaren, 10/10-01). A representative for 
Fiskarlaget Sør, (Region south) claimed during the Annual Meeting that the coastal 
fishermen were punished for the over-fishing done by the purse seines. Implying that 
despite technological advances in the trolling fishery they were not given the opportunity 
to improve their effectiveness due to the quota situation that had been brought on by the 
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The Resulting Allocation Key 
October 17th Fiskaren could report the final compromise. The resulting allocation key is 












Figure 5.3. The 2001 allocation key for the mackerel fishery. Based on the percentage shares from 
the Annual Meeting. For the coastal group, the quota is not to be less than 25.000 tonnes. Coast 
18,5%, trawl 3%, SUK 8,2% of the purse seine quota 78,3%. 
 
The new key implies that all group quotas will follow variations in the national TAC 
(Total Allowable Catch). Prior to the new key, the coastal percentage in 2001 had been 17 
percent with a quota of 30.000 tonnes. According to Fiskaren (17/10-01) with the same 
quota and price on mackerel the coastal group have gained 18 million kr, and the trawlers 
12 million meaning 30 million less for the purse seines. The purse seine and SUK vessels 
fished mackerel for a value of approximately 1billion kr in 2001. In 2001 96 purse seine 
and 20 SUK vessels participated in the 2001 mackerel fishery (Fiskeridirektøren, 2001).  
 
The debate that had been evident in the media gave another impression that what the 
Minister of Fisheries, Otto Gregussen had, it seemed that there was not as broad support 
for the proposed allocation key as he expressed. Much of the debate was also concerned 
with the representation and positions of groups within the Annual Meeting and the 
Executive Board. The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association wanted more representation 
in both. Their argument was that their members contributed with 60 percent of the 
financing (Fiskaren, 3/10-01). The mandates for all representatives were thigh, and 
therefore it seemed that the Norwegian Fishermen's Association was threatened by 
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fractionating. The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association put forward an ultimatum and 
said the limit was 1 percent of the mackerel quota, the majority suggested 18,5 percent 
(1,5percent) to the coastal group (Fiskaren, 15/10-01). On several accounts, the 
representatives were encouraged to overcome their differences (see Fiskaren 10/10-01). 
The Fisheries Director stated that a fractionating would mean that the bureaucrats would 
be dominating the management (Fiskaren, 15/10-01) implying less influence to the 
fishermen in the decision-making system. According to the editor in Fiskaren, the 
representative from the trawler interests who were the only two of the 64 representatives 
to vote against the proposal did not represent a threat to the unity of the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association (Fiskaren, 17/10-01). According to the editor in Fiskaren, the 
organisation of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association would benefit from a more 
functional organisation and larger regions. The development in the decreasing numbers of 
fishermen has lead to some county branches to have less autonomy, and because the 
fisheries become more specialised (Fiskaren, 3/10-01). As the numbers of members in the 
county branches are decreasing, the representational principle becomes an issue. In the 
current organisational structure, several groups will feel powerless, territorial and 
functional. The trawlers signalled that they would use their political affiliations a new 
battle over the mackerel quotas (Fiskaren, 17/10-01). At the end of the Annual Meeting, a 
new government had been formed, a coalition of the central and conservative parties. The 
new Minister of Fisheries, Svein Ludvigsen was appointed from the Conservative Party. 
The prior Minister had stated that he would respect the new allocations, but in March he 
had also said that he would not consider any reallocation till after the Annual Meeting. 
The Fisheries Director stated in Fiskaren (17/10-01) that the fishermen had through the 
new allocations been able to speak with one voice which gave the allocation keys 
legitimacy, and that he intended to follow through the recommendations. The new 
Minister sent the keys to the Parliament in the intent of locking the allocations between 
the fleet segments for the next seven years. This will according to the reporter in Fiskaren 
make it more difficult to intervene like the Minister, Peter Angelsen, did in 1998 
(Fiskaren, 11/1-02) According to Minister of Fisheries, Svein Ludvigsen, a locking of the 
key would reduce the political pressure. That would according to Fiskaren imply that the 
Minister of Fisheries, Svein Ludvigsen, has relieved himself from the opportunity to 
change the quota allocations. Changes would have to go through Parliament (Fiskaren, 
11/1-02). Earlier in December 2001, a preliminary statement from Peter Ørebech in his 
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work for the new Maktutredning (an analysis over power relations in the country) was that 
it was the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association that controlled both the Minister of 
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Chapter 6: From open access to regulated access in the coastal mackerel 
fishery 
 
The development in the coastal fishery 
The numbers of vessels participating in the coastal mackerel fishery from 1980-1994 had 
significantly decreased. The number of vessels under 21,35m using conventional gear had 
reduced from 1534 to 380 in 1994. This was also the trend in the coastal seine vessels 
(Norges Fiskarlag, 2001)9. In 1991, the Resource Allocation Committee predicted that as 
a result of the closure in the cod fisheries the pressure in the "herring fisheries" would 
increase. Thus, the closure of the cod fisheries would have a domino effect (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 1991). However this cannot be said to have affected the coastal mackerel 
fishery even though there was a slight increase in the coastal seine vessels in 1990. Figure 












Figure 6.1 The development in participating coastal vessels, 1980-2000. The numbers for the 
gillnet/trolling and seine under 13m is somewhat too high as several vessels participate in both 
fisheries. 
 
In the 1980s gillnet and trolling vessels took most of the coastal catches, but by 1988 the 
larger seine vessels surpassed in catch size. Gillnet and trolling catches were steadily 
declining until 1994, in 1993 these vessels caught only 1787 tonnes. The total catches in 
the coastal mackerel fishery was in the period of 1990-1994 been between 21.000-15.000 
tonnes. From 1994, there was an increase in participating vessels in all groups. The 
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Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association in 1994 had opened for the 
possibility of the limiting access in the coastal seine group under 70 feet, the reason being 
to limit increased participation in this group (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). But from the 
numbers observed in the figure (figure, 6.1) there was no real increase of participating 
vessels. However, what had increased was the share to the Northern Norway counties (see 
figure 4.3) where almost all mackerel is fished by seine vessels larger than 28m (see 
chapter 4). At the time (1994) the profitability in the pelagic fisheries was low, operating 
margin10 for vessels over 13m was in 1993 less than 5 percent11. With the price support 
under the Main Agreement being abolished in 1994, it may seem that the competition for 
the catch would increase. Limited access was in the 1994 report only discussed in general 
terms as a means to avoid economic over fishing (Paulsen and Steinshamn, 1994). In 
1996 the “Hallenstvedt-report” concluded that there was no over capacity in the coastal 
seine fishery, and as a result the 1996 Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association decided that there was no need to limit access for the coastal seine fleet 
(Norge Fiskarlag, 2001). In 1995 the only requirement to participate in the coastal 
mackerel fishery was that the fishermen and vessels ware registered. Until 1995, the quota 
to the coastal fleet was stipulated, and not a set group quota. However, the decision in the 
1994 Annual Meeting in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association was that the vessels 
using traditional gear would be allowed to continue the fishery even after the group quota 
had been caught (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). 
 
Positioning 
In 1996, the numbers of participating vessels increased to 620 coastal vessels in total. In 
1995 only 409 vessels participated. This year the average price for coastal caught 
mackerel was 5,57 against 3,12 the previous year12. According to Pehrson and Ramsli 
(1998) the market situation for coastal caught mackerel seemed to be improving. 
Previously this mackerel had been mainly landed for domestic consumption where only 
minimum prices was achieved, in 1996 more of the coastal mackerel was landed for the 
better paying export market (Pherson and Ramsli, 1998). According to the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association (2001) good accessibility, high prices and the prospect of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
9 From table 5.21 in the Report from the Resource Allocation Committee, 2001 
10 Operating margin=(operating result/operating revenues)*100. 5% operating margin means that for each 
100kr sold, 5 kr is earned in profit 
11 Fiskeridirektoratet (2000) Number from figure 12B, p 28 
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limiting access was the reason for this situation. Though perhaps accessibility for the 
coastal vessels was good, the total quota of North East Atlantic mackerel was significantly 
reduced from 1995-1996 (Iversen, 2001). According to the Herring Sales Organisation, 
the markets in Asia were very interested in the Norwegian mackerel (Norges 
Sildesalgslag, 1996). According to Pehrson and Ramsli (1998) the positioning in the 
coastal group was underscored by the positive price development. Though the gillnet and 
trolling fishery had been excepted, the catch in the coastal group had only surpassed the 
group quota in 1994 prior to the events in 1996 and only by 1000 tonnes. Then the 
Minister of Fisheries stopped the coastal fishery for all groups in September (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 2001).  
 
Towards final closure 
When the Minister of Fisheries, Jan Henry T. Olsen (Labour party) closed the coastal 
fishery including for the traditional gillnet and trolling fishery the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association protested. According to the Fishermen's Association this was a breach of 
promise and argued that the decision should not be made in an extraordinary situation, but 
the Norwegian Fisherman’s Association was unsuccessful in their attempt to alter the 
Ministers decision (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). When asked for the reason and what the 
Minister would do in the following year with the difficulties that this closure had posed in 
the coastal fishery the reply was that the increased effort in this group had in fact lead to 
an over fishing (Stortingets spørretime, 1996). Furthermore the Minister said that the 30 
percent reduction in the total TAC (Total allowable Catch) the EU and Norway had 
agreed on had in full been carried by the purse seine fleet since the coastal group did not 
have their 20.000 tonnes quota cut. The Minister interpreted condition for continued 
fishing in the gillnet and trolling fishery that the fishing pattern in this group did not 
change. With the increased participation in the coastal groups the Minister felt he had no 
choice than to stop the fishery. He further said that this group had fished significantly 
more than they had the previous year, and due to the high prices achieved there was no 
reason to complain, as the profits now would be three times high as the previous year. 
Norway as a responsible fisheries nation could not permit deliberate over fishing (The 
Minister of Fisheries in Parliament 11/10-96, Stortinget). According to Pehrson and 
Ramsli (1998), the stop in the traditional fishery lead to a discussion referring to the quota 
                                                                                                                                                                              
12Government of Norway (1998) Price from St.Meld 51, Appendix 3, Table 3.9 
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allocation that was decided in 1994. As a result of the events in the 1996 fishery, the 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association divided gillnet and trolling vessels and the traditional 
coastal seine into a separate group from the remaining coastal seines in 1997 (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 2001). In July 1997 the Department of Fisheries implemented a limitation in 
access in the coastal seines over 13m after a discussion with the industry. The Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association was opposed based on that there was no over capacity in the 
coastal seine group (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). The Boat Owners Association expressed 
content with this development towards limited access, but expressed that it was not 
sufficient (Fiskebåtredernes Forbund, 1997).   
 
The Norwegian Vessel Owner Association had during a meeting in august 1997 discussed 
the limitation of access in the coastal mackerel fishery. The decisions made during this 
meeting were that the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association would continue their work 
toward limiting the access in the coastal mackerel fishery. This was found necessary to 
avoid increased participation and pressure on the quota allocation (Fiskebåtredernes 
Forbund, 1997). The situation in coastal mackerel fishery did lead to an increased 
pressure on the allocation. The Norwegian Fishermen's Association had to renegotiate the 
group quota after requests by members groups, and the group quota was set to 25.00 
tonnes (see chapter 5). In 1998 the Executive Board endorsed a limited access for the 
seine vessels over 13m, but wanted the criterion to be that they had to have participated at 
least in 2 of the previous years and landed at least 25 percent of their quota (maximum 
quota) (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). In view of the Boat Owners Associations discussions in 
1997 where the Executive Board in this organisation expressed surprise that the 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association had in July 1997 criticised the government for the 
limited access. The with the change in the tone of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association 
Executive board in 1998 it seems to have been influenced by the Norwegian Vessel 
Owner Association.   
 
The Executive Board of The Norwegian Fishermen's Association opted for a limitation 
also for gillnet and trolling vessels over 13m. The Department did not limit the access in 
this group in 1998, but tightened the criterion for participation in the coastal seine vessels 
over 13m (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). The limitations for gillnet and trolling vessels over 
13m were however implemented by the Department in 1999. In 2000 the coastal mackerel 
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fishery with exemption of the coastal seine vessels over 13m, the fishery lasted from 
august 14th to September 6th, as a result the coastal fishery was characterised by high 
competition and chaos (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001).  
 
The situation in the coastal mackerel fishery had been unsatisfactory after the 1994 
allocation and with the decision in Annual Meeting in the 1996 (no limitation in 
participation), a work group had been appointed in 1998 to address the issues concerned 
with the coastal fishery. The considerations to be taken was the quality of the fish, the 
income of the participating vessels and that the participating vessels could use their access 
right in the most rational manner. The conclusion was that it would be impossible to come 
to realistic and reasonable changes in the regulations for the coastal fishery when the 
quota was at a maximum 20.000 tonnes (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). As a consequence of 
the increased quota that was taken from the purse seine fleet, with the following quota 
increase from the Minister in 1998, some purse seine owners left the organisation (Norges 
Fiskarlag, 2001). 
 
As the only means to decrease the capacity in the coastal fisheries, the Resource 
Allocation Committee was the closing of the “commons” (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). Thus, 
the Committee wanted a closure in the vessels under 13m in the mackerel fishery. As a 
means to separate the participants, these would have to have participated in one of the 
three previous years. Participation in 2001 did not qualify (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). In 
January 2001, the department had sent the proposal out on “hearing”. The Department of 
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Chapter 7: Summary and Discussion 
 
At this point it is appropriate to return to the research questions that were posed in the 
introduction and sum up briefly. This is followed by a discussion of the thesis objective, 
which was to better understand the processes leading to the current allocation key and the 
closure of the coastal mackerel fishery, and from that make some concluding remark 
about the nature and implication of the Norwegian approach to fisheries management. 
 
Summary 
The first question posed is related to the rationale behind the allocation keys, why were 
the allocation keys introduced in 1994 and in 2001? From the 1980s (see fig 4.1) the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) had varied, in 1988 the TAC was at a level of 141.000tonnes and 
by 1994 the TAC was 248.000tonnes. Three different fleet groups were fishing on the 
same TAC, the offshore purse seine fleet (including the SUK vessels), the trawlers and the 
coastal fleet (coastal seines under 21,35m and gillnet and trolling vessels under 21,5m). 
Prior to 1994 the allocations between the fleet groups were decided in annual 
negotiations. In the 1980s the percentage share of the TAC to the coast and offshore fleet 
varied considerably (see figure 3.1), and a need for more stable conditions for both the 
fishermen's income prospects and in within the Norwegian Fishermen's Association was 
desired (see chapter 4, concerning the allocations discussed in 1991). Prior to 1990 the 
vessels operating in the pelagic fisheries had negative operating margins, and as the 
European Economic Area agreement was implemented in 1994 the need for an 
economically self-sufficient fishing fleet became more pressing. The fishery had 
gradually gone from being a subsidised industry to an industry that needed to focus on 
economic efficiency. By using TAC to limit harvest levels, allocations on different vessel 
groups is natural consequence. Without some allocation between the fleets, it would be no 
difficulty for the purse seine fleet to fish the entire TAC. A natural division would be 
between the fleets that had developed over the years. A long-term allocation key was 
desirable both from an economic perspective and in order to calm down the allocation 
discussions within the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. It was regarded necessary to 
take the allocation key up for revision after some years, in order to account for 
developments in the resource base and price changes. In addition, the allocations should 
not be of such duration that the common property regime could be questioned. The 
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planned revision was in 2001. The resulting key would reflect the conflict that revolved 
around the 1994 allocation key.  
 
Second, I asked why the authorities did not follow the proposed keys. The answer lies 
partly in the development in quotas and in the development in the value of the fishery. 
From 1994 to 1995 the TAC (Total Allowable Catch) decreased from 248.000 tonnes to 
200.000tonnes in 1995. By 1996 the TAC was at only 133.000 tonnes, a 66 percent 
reduction from 1994. The prospect for the fishery in terms of quantity was not uplifting. 
With this reduction of the TAC, the coastal group quota of 20.000 tonnes remained stable, 
and the purse seine fleet had their quota reduced in accordance with the allocation key. In 
addition to the group quota, the traditional coastal fishery (seine vessels under 13m and 
gillnet and trolling vessels under 21,35m) could continue to fish even after the group 
quota was taken. The Ministry of Fisheries (Jan Henry T Olsen, Labour party) stopped 
this practice in 1996. Though the quotas had developed in a negative direction, prices had 
increased and there had been some increase in the participants in the coastal fishery in 
1996. Frustrations from coastal fishermen was evident, in political circles there was also 
an impression that the allocation key had not benefited the coastal mackerel fishermen 
(Fiskaren, 14/10-97, Stortingets spørretime, 3/6-97). As a consequence the Minister of 
Fisheries (Peter Angelsen, Senterpartiet) increased the coastal mackerel quota to 
30.000tonnes for the fishery in 1998. The Norwegian Fishermen's Association had 
internally decided a quota of 25.000tonnes for 1998 and had thus deviated from its own 
recommendations through the 1994-allocation key. This increased quota was not received 
well in the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association, who reacted by severely criticising the 
Minister of Fisheries. The Minister in response expressed surprise over such fierce 
reaction. In his view the purse seiners had more than sufficient shares of the herring (58 
%) and the mackerel (85 %) quotas. The Minister pointed out that the he was interested in 
a long term allocation, but that the coastal group also should have the opportunity to take 
part in the increased profitability of the industry (Fiskaren, 30/12-97). In short, the 
allocation key of 1994 was by the Minister and in political circles considered biased, 
disfavouring the coastal fishermen in an industry where profitability was increasing (see 
figure 5.1).  
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The third research question was what the results were in actual quota allocations and 
catch. Though the coastal group had their quota increased from 20.000 tonnes to 30.000 
tonnes from 1998 and onward, the increase was only minor deviations from previous 
years. The coastal quota was in 1998 increased from 15percent in 1997 to 19,1 in 1998 
and 1999. But in 2000 the quota was only 17,4 percent. These minor increases came from 
the purse seine quota. The share of the catches followed the actual quotas. In reality, 
increasing the group quota by 10.000tonnes was only a marginal adjustment from the 
1994-allocation key (see figure 5.2 and 4.4). The adjustment hardly constituted as any 
significant change in political direction. The reactions from the Norwegian Vessel Owner 
Association demonstrated how volatile the situation could be if the authorities altered the 
compromise the Norwegian Fishermen's Association had worked out. The same situation 
was observed during the 2001 Annual Meeting where the threat of fraction was evident. 
This was considered beneficial by the authorities as the political cost was seen as too high. 
Being the Minister of Fisheries that led to a dissolved Norwegian Fishermen's Association 
would not go down in the history books as a hero.  
 
Finally, the question of why the coastal mackerel fishery was closed is addressed. Limited 
access had been an economic regulation used in the offshore purse seine fishery since 
1973, the trawlers were also limited according to a registration scheme. With the cod 
fisheries being successfully closed in 1990 as a response to the cod crisis (see Hersoug et 
al, 1999), this lead to a precedence for the other fisheries. In 1991 when the long-term 
allocations were discussed, there was a concern that fishermen who had also fished in the 
cod fisheries but was no excluded would increase their efforts in the pelagic fisheries 
(Norges Fiskarlag, 1991). As the purse seine fishery already had been limited, the only 
fishery open for expansion was the coastal fishery. For the Norwegian Vessel Owner 
Association, limiting the access in the coastal fisheries was highly prioritised on their 
agenda (Fiskebåtredernes Forbund, 1997). An increased catch in the coastal mackerel 
fishery would be drawn from their allocated quota. Though the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association first had withdrawn from their support of limited access in this fishery, the 
organisation changed direction after 1997 when the limited access was implemented for 
the coastal seiners over 13m. The first development of limiting the access in this fishery 
was when the Minister of Fisheries closed the fishery in September 1996. There was a 
situation of positioning, and the Minister of Fisheries argued that the practice of permitted 
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over fishing was not that of a responsible fisheries nation. It is clear that the Norwegian 
Vessel Owner Association was actively pushing for this development. There were chaotic 
conditions under the coastal mackerel fisheries, a typical exhibit of "race to fish". The 
motive of the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association was clear, and the authorities' view 
was that continued open access would lead to undesirable conditions during the fishery. 
Hence, what was started as limited entry for the purse seines in 1973 ended up with the 
2001 allocation key and closing access to the coastal mackerel fisheries. Approximately 




The objective of this thesis was to better understand the processes behind the development 
in the mackerel fishery towards allocation keys and limited access in the coastal fishery. 
In this section the observations from the mackerel case is discussed in light of the 
theoretical aspects presented in chapter two. Based on this discussion I aim to make some 
concluding remarks on the approach to fisheries management in Norway.  
 
Legitimacy is according to Jentoft (2000a; 144) "a premise and not only an outcome of a 
management system". Thus a management system may be evaluated according to the 
perception of legitimacy related to it. The external legitimacy of the system may be 
different from the internal perception of legitimacy. Though many different stakeholders 
may be identified, only those who acquire attributes of legitimate claims, power and 
urgency are likely to be definite stakeholders and thus be participants within the system. 
Furthermore legitimacy may be evaluated according to procedure or content. It is a 
common notion from democratic theory that a person that may not agree with the outcome 
of a decision is more inclined to accept if he or she has the opportunity to communicate 
his opinion (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). This implies that procedural legitimacy may 
compensate for a lower perception of content legitimacy. According to Jentoft (2000a), if 
the parties perceive legitimacy as low, two affected reactions may unfold where voice is 
preferred to exit if there is room for communication. In the case of the mackerel fishery 
“voices” have certainly been loud, while “exit” has been limited.   
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Insufficient content or procedural legitimacy? 
The allocation keys may be considered an attempt in which the conflicts between the 
fishermen could be resolved. This was clearly stated in the report from the allocation 
committee in 1991. In this account the principle of using historical catches was posed as 
suitable for providing a least controversial allocation key. Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) 
repeated this in the assessment in 1994. The basic idea was that using historical catches 
would yield legitimacy. This account may be related to that of content, in that some pre-
established standards and demands will yield legitimacy (Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2001). 
However, what is strikingly clear from the case of the mackerel fishery, is that these 
standards and demands are weighted against different notions of what is considered 
rational, reasonable and just for those who are affected by the allocation keys; fishermen 
are far from being an homogenous group. The time frame of 10-15 years in which 
historical "rights" have been established seems unfair to those fishermen in a fishery that 
have roots much further back in history. However, what is rational may be to assign 
allocations according to the current situation, as Paulsen and Steinshamn (1994) points 
out, the total fleet composition, resource base and activity patterns have changed 
significantly over the last decades. But the market situation and price development have 
also changed in the mackerel fishery turning it into a lucrative enterprise. Was it then 
reasonable to use the historical catches for the allocation of a fishery that is now worth 
more than a billion in first hand value to only benefit a few? As Jentoft and Mikalsen 
states (2001), legitimacy is more a function of expectations, plans and goals for the future 
than the result of traditions and passed actions. The expectations prevailing in 1994 may 
not have been so optimistic as they would be only a few years later. The EU referendum 
ended with a no, and the diminishing financial transfers in form of price subsidies were 
not as devastating as could be expected in 1994. Though the development of the TACs 
seemed discouraging, and in fact was reduced in 1996, the price increased more than 
outweighed any loss in actual catch. What might have been acceptable in 1994 for the 
coastal fishermen, a guaranteed quota of 20.000 tonnes regardless of the variations of the 
TAC (Total Allowable Catch) suddenly became a limitation for opportunities. Also the 
prospect of “permitted” over-fishing, for the gill-netters, trollers and seine vessels under 
13m, may have sweetened the pill. However, the accepted over fishing was no longer 
perceived as legitimate externally. The account by the Minister of Fisheries in Parliament 
on October 11th 1996 clearly expresses such a notion.  
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It may seem that the procedural legitimacy created more discontent than the actual 
contents of the allocation keys and the limited access. The Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association had during their Annual Meeting in 1996 reconsidered the need for limiting 
the access in the coastal mackerel fishery (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). However, the 
Executive Board in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association altered its position again in 
1998, and actually wanted a more strict regulation than what the Department of Fisheries 
had implemented (Norges Fiskarlag, 2001). That the Norwegian Vessel Owner 
Association had during its Annual Meeting in 1997 expressed more or less the same view 
may be interpreted as an increased acceptance for its view on the issue. The decision in 
the Executive Board thus directly countered the decision that was made under the Annual 
Meeting of 1996. Both allocation keys came about as compromises, where the pressure on 
the organisation for a united Norwegian Fisherman's Association was high both internally 
and externally. Much of the problem is related to the representation of conflicting interests 
internally in the Norwegian Fishermen's Association. Prior to 1964, the Norwegian 
Fishermen's Association consisted of regional branches, and thus representation was 
territorial. However, functional group organisations such as the Norwegian Vessel Owner 
Association had repeatedly contested the exclusive role that the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association had in the annual negotiations over financial transfers under the Main 
Agreement (Norsk Fiskerinæring, 2001). As a consequence, the Norwegian Fishermen's 
Association would from then on have two principles for representation, functional and 
territorial. According to Hoel et al (1991) the differences between interests pertaining to 
region, technology and economy makes the Norwegian Fishermen's Association a fragile 
coalition. According to Hoel et al (ibid) the functional groups are able to compensate for 
their minority status by overlapping membership and by retaining autonomy and 
administrative capacity. In addition, the Norwegian Vessel Owner Association contributes 
to 60 percent of the Norwegian Fishermen's Association's finances. In 1997, the 
fishermen's sales organisations' financial contributions were reduced after a verdict in the 
Supreme Court (Norges Sildesalgslag, 1997). In 2002 the Norwegian Vessel Owner 
Association organises 35 enterprises and 298 vessels (www.fiskebaatreder.no, 2002). 
They have a representation in the Executive Board of 27,3 percent, and 17,3 percent at the 
Annual Meeting (Fiskaren, 3/10-01). According to Hoel et al (1991) the Executive Board 
dominates the processes within the Fishermen's Association. That small-scale coastal 
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fishermen feel alienated in this context should be no surprise. An alternative organisation 
may be the Norwegian Coastal Fishermen's Association, but at the time this organisation 
have only observational status in the Regulatory Council. According to Jentoft and 
McCay (1995) representation must be balanced in a manner that decisions can be made 
that all can agree on, and which gains support within the respective constituencies and the 
various groups of fishermen are given a relative share of the decision making process. 
What principle should thus dictate the relative share of representation? It is tempting use 
Rokkans expression “votes count but resources decide”. Not only may this cause 
considerable problem for internal procedural legitimacy, considerable influence in an 
organisation based on what accredit to power may be perceived as dubious externally 
also. According to Jentoft (2000b) representation that is territorial rather than functional is 
likely to have a decision making process that is less characterised as a zero-sum game. 
Then regional instead of group quotas could yield more room for manoeuvring. However 
in the case of the mackerel fishery, it is not likely that a territorial representation would 
rectify the bias the strong functional representation yields (see figure, 4.3). Another 
alternative may be that of broadening the participation in the co-management 
arrangement. Broader participation has been discussed by academics (see Mikalsen, 
1998). At least it could be wise to ensure that the coastal fishermen get a relative share of 




As the established allocation keys will guide the future developments of the industry both 
in terms of the type of fleet and fishery Norway will have, the content and procedures are 
of interest to other stakeholders as well. However, though the situation for the coastal 
fishermen may receive political sympathy it may be useful to repeat Jentoft and 
Mikalsen's (2001), statement: legitimacy is more a function of future expectations, plans 
and goals than the result of traditions and passed actions. There is no doubt about the 
ambitions of the larger vessel owners. They would like to restructure the industry, 
independently of political influence. On the other hand the small-scale operators in the 
coastal fleet are also increasingly devoted to economic efficiency. Co-management within 
the “family” will hence concentrate on a long-term allocation, which is now determined 
for the next 7 years. The question that is still open for debate is whether this system will 
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be accepted in the wider circle of stakeholders. Thus the external legitimacy of the 
allocation key may still be questionable. The issue of payments for exclusive rights is 
therefore e just around the corner. Stable conditions, in particular political, may therefore 
be something of an illusion, even if the annual allocation battle is now history.  
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